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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND FAIR HOUSING:
MUST A LANDLORD RENT AGAINST HIS
CONSCIENCE?
JAMES C. GEOLY* & KEVIN R. GUSTAFSON**
INTRODUCTION

A growing number of landlords have asserted that due to
their religious faith the government will hold them accountable
for the way they use their property. Some of these landlords have
refused to rent to unmarried couples who wish to cohabit on the
grounds. These landlords believe this cohabitation constitutes
participation in sinful conduct. Frequently, the landlord's religiously-inspired conduct is counter to state and local housing
codes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status.'
Landlords, though, are increasingly winning exemptions from
local housing discrimination statutes based on the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.2 This Article briefly summarizes the legal

* B.A., Columbia University, 1982; J.D., University of Chicago, 1985. Mr.
Geoly is Counsel to the Religious and Human Services Practice Group of the law
firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago, Illinois.
** B.A., Wheaton College, 1987; J.D., The John Marshall Law School, 1992.
Mr. Gustafson is an attorney with the Religious and Human Services Practice
Group of the law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt in Chicago, Illinois.
1. Under the Fair Housing Act, individuals are generally protected from discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1968). Section 3607 of the Fair Housing
Act provides a limited exemption from these prohibitions to a "religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated,
supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or society." 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1996). A qualifying religious entity may limit
"the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than
a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion." Id. See also Claudia Reed,
Note, Housing Law - United States v. Columbus Country Club: How "Religious"
Does An OrganizationHave To Be To Qualify For The FairHousingAct's Religious
Organization Exemption?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 61 (1993). Private landlords
may also take advantage of the religious exemption, such as to induce religious
colleges to house students in their rental units. Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain
Properties, 876 F. Supp. 1231, 1246 (D. Utah 1995).
2. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb;
42 U.S.C. § 1988; 5 U.S.C. § 504). The Act states:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993".
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SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS-The Congress finds that(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion
as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to
the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings
is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests.
(b) PURPOSES.-The purposes of this Act are(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.
SEC. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) EXCEPTION-Government may substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c) JUDICIAL RELIEF.-A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.
SEC. 4. ATTORNEYS FEES.
(a) JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.-Section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42
U.S.C. 1988) is amended by inserting "the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993," before "or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964".
(b) ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS-Section 504(b)(1)(C) of title 5,
United States Code, is amended(1) by striking "and" at the end of clause (ii);
(2) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ',
and"; and
(3) by inserting "(iv) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993;"
after clause (iii).
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act(1) the term "government" includes a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the
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basis of the religious free exercise right as a defense to discrimination claims and as an affirmative right to fair housing.
I. LEGAL SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM3
A. FirstAmendment of the U.S. Constitution
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."4 The
"free exercise" of religion means the right to believe and profess
any religious belief, as well as the right to be free from the imposition of religious beliefs by the government.5 Both rights are
absolute except when religious beliefs are expressed through religiously-motivated conduct.' In this situation, the court weighs
religious beliefs against legitimate concerns for the safety, order

United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State;
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each territory and possession of the United
States;
(3) the term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of going forward
with the evidence and of persuasion; and
(4) the term "exercise of religion" means the exercise of religion under
the First Amendment to the Constitution.
SEC. 6. APPLICABILITY.
(a) IN GENERAL.-This Act applies to all Federal and State law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after the enactment of this Act.
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Federal statutory law adopted after the
date of the enactment of this Act is subject to this Act unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this Act.
(c) RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNAFFECTED.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize any government to burden any religious belief.
SEC. 7. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNAFFECTED.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect, interpret, or in any way
address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting the
establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the "Establishment
Clause"). Granting government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute a
violation of this Act. As used in this section, the term "granting", used with
respect to government funding, benefits, or exemptions, does not include the
denial of government funding benefits, or exemptions.
Id.
3. In this context, we refer to the right to the free exercise of religion. Although some would characterize the bar of the Establishment Clause as "religious
freedom" as well, it does not create the kind of positive right that is the subject of
this article.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has applied the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment to the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
5. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
6. Id.
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or well-being of the nation and its people.'
The United States Supreme Court developed a weighted
balancing test to resolve this tension between an individual's religious expression and the government restrictions of that expression. In Sherbert v. Verner,' the Court held that the government
must have a compelling governmental interest to justify a substantial burden of a religious practice. 9 "Compelling" requires
that the action must be paramount or of the highest importance. 10 Moreover, the government must choose the least restrictive means available to serve the government's "compelling" interest." Thus, the government could not bar a religious activity if
mere time or space restrictions could serve its "compelling interest."
In 1990, the Supreme Court departed from thirty years of
free-exercise jurisprudence in Employment Division, Department
of Human Services of Oregon v. Smith. 2 In Smith, the Court rejected the claimants' assertion that, as Native Americans, their
use of the narcotic peyote was solely for religious purposes and
should not be considered "misconduct" sufficient to disqualify
them from a claim for unemployment benefits." The Court held
that use of peyote, whether religiously inspired or not, was illegal
under Oregon's drug laws and that the right to free exercise of
religion could not exempt individuals from the scope of such neutral, generally applicable laws. 4
The Court 5 acknowledged that the heightened constitutional protection of the Free Exercise Clause still applied to intentional and direct assaults on religious activity." Such assaults include laws prohibiting belief in a particular doctrine or banning
otherwise legal activities only for religious purposes. 17 The
Court, however, refused to apply the Sherbert "compelling governmental interest" test to neutral laws. 8 Instead, the Court held
that when nuetral laws burden religious free exercise the courts
should review these laws under the less demanding "rational

7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. Id. at 403.
10. Id. at 406. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (holding that only
interests that were of "the highest order" would be considered compelling).
11. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408-09.
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. Id. at 890.
14. Id. at 878, 890.
15. Justice Scalia wrote on behalf of the majority. Id. at 872.
16. Id. at 877.
17. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Services of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990).
18. Id. at 880-81.
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basis" standard. 9 In addition, the Court acknowledged that the
compelling governmental interest test would still apply to neutral,
generally applicable laws that affect a religious activity only if the
claimant combined a Free Exercise claim with another constitutional right, such as freedom of speech or press.2" This combination would create a hybrid right entitled to strict scrutiny.2 1
Thus, if a law is "neutrally, generally applicable," the government will meet its burden and overcome a Free Exercise challenge, even if the law does in fact significantly burden the exercise
of religion.22 Instead of "paramount" governmental interest, the
government must only show that the law is "reasonable" or "important." For example, a law prohibiting all consumption of alcohol by minors, a seemingly neutral law of general applicability,
may impose a special burden on the use of sacramental wine in
Catholic, Protestant or Jewish rites. Under Smith, clergy could
face prosecution if wine were served to a minor, notwithstanding
the role of wine in their respective religious traditions. 23 In response to this grave concern, the Court retorted:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.24
This approach left the entire religious community unprotected from unwanted, unwarranted and even unintended government
intrusion into their respective religious activities.25 In light of

19. Id. at 878-90. Under the rational basis test, a statute will be upheld if the
government had, or could have had any rational basis to enact it. Id.
20. Id. at 881.
21. Id.
22. Some cases have interpreted Smith to be limited to laws punishing criminal
conduct. American Friends Services Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405,
1407 (9th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir.
1991); Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist.,
817 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
23. It has been suggested that in the illustration given above, "common-sense,
prosecutorial discretion" will prevent abuses through a system of selective enforcement. Of course, if fundamental rights, such as the right of religious expression, were left to the paternalistic discretion of the majority, society would have no
need for the Bill of Rights.
24. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Services of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990). Justice Scalia believes that "[any society adopting such a system
would be courting anarchy." Id. at 888.
25. In the wake of Smith, several cases involving religious freedom illustrated
Smith's disturbing implications. In Yang v. Sterner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 560 (D.R.I.
1990), the court allowed an unnecessary autopsy on a young man despite the vigor-
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the emasculation of the Free Exercise Clause under Smith, most
claimants now base their free exercise claims on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.
B. Religious Freedom RestorationAct

One of the broadest political coalitions in recent history supported the signing of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) on November 17, 1993.26 The Act creates a private right
27
of action for violations of the right to freely exercise religion.
The Act also creates an affirmative defense against civil and crim-

ous protests from his family that, under their religious beliefs, an autopsy would
condemn the spirit of the deceased. In In re Welfare of T.K. & W.K, 475 N.W.2d
88, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), two minor children had been taken away from a
mother because she had home schooled them and, pursuant to religious beliefs,
refused to have them take standardized tests. Although the children were returned
under the application of state constitutional protection, the Minnesota Appellate
Court acknowledged that under Smith the parents had no protection for their religious beliefs. Id. at 93. See also Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948
F.2d 464, 468 (8th Cir. 1991) (allowing city to ban churches in certain areas of city
as a valid time, place and manner restriction); Rectors, Wardens & Members of
Vestry of Saint Bartholomew's Church v. City of N.Y., 914 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that church did not obtain protection of First Amendment to avoid
city laws that hindered the Church's ability to raise revenue for religious
charitable activities); Greater N.Y. Health Care Facilities v. Axelrod, 770 F. Supp.
183, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (permitting state to limit services volunteers may perform
at non-profit nursing homes).
Perhaps most shocking was the report of Mother Teresa's shelter for the
homeless being closed in New York. Sam Roberts, Fight City Hall? Nope, Not Even
Mother Teresa, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990, at B1.The shelter was closed because it
did not have an elevator to the second floor and thus was deemed inaccessible to
the handicapped. Id. The Sisters did not install an elevator as a matter of religious
principle (they are committed to a simple life) and offered to carry any handicapped residents up the stairs. Id. With no fear of reprisal under Smith, city officials refused to accommodate the religious shelter, stating 'This isn't India, this is
America, and carrying people up the stairs is inconstant with American notions of
human dignity." Id. As a result, Mother Teresa was unable to keep the shelter
open. Id.
26. For a more comprehensive review of the Act, including its impact and its
history, see Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Robert F.
Drinan & Jennifer Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative
History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531 (1993/1994); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994); Douglas
Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
73 TEx. L. REV. 209 (1994); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Issues Facing Religious Educational Institutions That Discriminate on the Basis of Religion, 97 EDUC. L. REP. 15
(Apr. 1995); Leon F. Szetpycki & Jean B. Arnold, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 88 EDUC. L. REP. 907 (Apr. 1994).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c). The RFRA also provides for attorneys fees for prevailing plaintiffs. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(iv). See also Helbrans v. Coombe, 890 F.
Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (illustrating the amount and rate of attorneys' fees a
court will allow under the RFRA).
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inal charges that creates burdens on the free exercise of religion.2" The RFRA was intended to restore the protection of religious liberty eviscerated by the Smith decision.2 9
Importantly, the RFRA does not, nor does it attempt to, overturn Smith. Instead, Congress created a free-standing federal
statutory right which simply adopts the pre-Smith free exercise
jurisprudence as its legal standard. ° Because of the lesser protection of the First Amendment under Smith, most claims involving religious freedom now should include the RFRA with the First
Amendment and state constitutional claims.
Under Section Three of the RFRA, if the claimant's religious
activity is substantially burdened, the government must show
that the restriction on the religious activity serves a compelling
governmental interest and that the restriction serves that interest
through the least restrictive means available. 3' Even though the
RFRA makes the level of scrutiny of a governmental action strict,
the court will only apply this scrutiny if the action actually burdens a religious activity.32 Thus, insignificant burdens on religious activities or significant burdens on non-religious activities
will not enjoy the heightened legal standard.
Although the government restriction may devastate a particular religious group, the restricted activity must be considered
"religious" in order to obtain protection by the RFRA.33 In order

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
29. Specifically, the purpose of the RFRA is "to restore the compelling interest
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b).
30. But see P.L. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 362 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (holding the RFRA unconstitutional because Congress attempted to overturn
Smith); In re Tessier, No. 94-31615-13, 1995 U.S. Bankr. WL 736461, *4 (D. Mont.
Dec. 8, 1995) (holding the RFRA unconstitutional because Congress attempts to
adopt legal standard already rejected by Supreme Court). See infra pages 18-21
and accompanying notes for a discussion of these cases and the issues of the
RFRA's constitutionality.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
32. This statement does not imply that an individual must endure discrimination or irreversible harm to invoke the protection of the law. Instead, the claimant
need only show that on its face the law or intended governmental action substantially burdens one's religious beliefs. Fence v. Jackson County, 900 P.2d 524, 528
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) ("person challenging a law's compliance with the [RFRA] need
not await a formal implementing action that denies a specific use.").
33. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (allowing the government to build roads over Native American lands even
though undisputed that activities "could have devastating effects on traditional
Indian religious practices"); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (permitting the
government to require a Social Security number to apply for and receive certain
benefits even if contrary to religious beliefs).
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to constitute religious conduct, the activity must be motivated
primarily by corresponding religious beliefs.34 The drafters of the
RFRA ensured that the RFRA would not limit religious activity to
a finite list of officially recognized activities.3 5 Apart from the
obvious Establishment Clause concerns that such a list would
present, a list would be difficult to compile and would risk significant omissions.
Moreover, the governmental burden on the religious activity
must be more than slight or inconsequential.36 In applying the
compelling governmental interest standard, the Supreme Court
has previously described as "substantial" those burdens arising:
where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.37
If the claimant shows that the government has substantially
burdened his or her religious conduct, the government must then
show that its restriction is necessary to advance a "compelling"
purpose.38 Thus, the government must articulate a specific compelling reason for not accommodating the religious activity.3 9 The
RFRA does not provide examples of sufficiently-compelling governmental interests but leaves this issue to a case-by-case analysis. 4° Even ifthe government's interest is so important to the
public as to constitute "compelling," the courts will still strike the
governmental action as invalid if the government had an alternative means that was less restrictive on the religious activity.4 1 In
other words, if granting a religious exemption to the government
provision will not substantially harm the government's compelling
interest, the government must accommodate the free exercise of
religion.
Since the passage of the RFRA in 1993, more than one hundred decisions have interpreted or implicated the RFRA.42 These
34. Much of the activity of churches and believers is not grounded in religious
'commands" or "prohibitions," but is nonetheless motivated by deeply-held religious
convictions. See Berg, supra note 26, at 52.
35. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 218-19.
36. See, e.g., Fleischfresser v. Directors of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that the school's reading program imposed no substantial burden on
free exercise of religion rights of parents and their children because it did not compel either parents or children to do or refrain from doing anything religious in
nature).
37. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 708 (1981).
38. Id.
39. Berg, supra note 26, at 31-40.
40. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 26, at 218-19.
41. Berg, supra note 26, at 40-45.
42. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S.Ct. 460 (1994) (mem.);
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decisions have established protection for religiously inspired conduct which might not have been protected under the weaker standard of Smith.43 Due to these decisions, some commentators have
criticized the RFRA as an attempt by Congress to "overturn" the
Supreme Court and the Smith decision."

Hamilton v. Schriro, No. 94-3845, 1996 U.S. App. WL 11119 (8th Cir. Jan. 12,
1996); Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973 (6th Cir. 1995); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
Safer Prods., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995); Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th
Cir. 1995); Malik v. Brown, 65 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1995); Brown v. Borough of
Mahaffey, Pa., 35 F.3d 846 (3d Cir. 1994); Vernon v. Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385
(9th Cir. 1994); First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla. v. Collier County, Fla., 27
F.3d 526 (11th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Louisiana Psychiatric Medical Ass'n, No. Civ.A.
95-2122, 1995 U.S. Dist. WL 746657 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 1995); In re Tessier, No. 9431615-13, 1995 U.S. Bankr. WL 736461 (D. Mont. Dec. 8, 1995); Hanrahan v.
Housing & Redevelopment Auth. of Duluth Minn., No. Civ. 5-95-19, 1995 U.S. Dist.
WL 783254 (D. Minn. Nov. 13, 1995); United States v. Myers, 906 F. Supp. 1494
(D. Wyo. 1995); Battles v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 904 F. Supp. 471 (D.
Md. 1995); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 902 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Utah 1995); Van
Dyke v. Washington, 896 F. Supp. 183 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Tenacre Found. v. INS, 892
F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1995); Dickerson v. Stuart, 877 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Fla.
1995); P.L. Flores v. Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 9550306, 1996 U.S. App. WL 23205 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996); Hsu v. Roslyn Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 876 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Lee v. Oregon, 869 F.
Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1995); Church of Iron Oak v. Palm Bay, Fla., 868 F. Supp. 1361
(M.D. Fla. 1994); Bessard v. California Community Colleges, 867 F. Supp. 1454
(E.D. Cal. 1994); United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of D.C., 862 F. Supp. 538
(D.D.C. 1994); Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. Philadelphia, No.
94-1633, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL 470191 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994), affd, 54 F.3d 768
(3d Cir. 1995); Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994); Fordham
Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. 1994); Celestial Church of Christ v. Chicago, No. 93 C 7610, 1994 U.S. Dist. WL 282304 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1994); In re
Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 574
(Ark. 1994); Smith v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct.
App.), superseded by, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567 (Cal. 1994); DeBose v. Bear Valley
Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Attorney General v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Jesus Ctr. v. LC Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of
App., No. 163536, 1996 Mich. App. WL 14771 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1996); Porth
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995);
Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Ryslik v. Krass, 652
A.2d 767 (N.J. 1995); Williams v. Bright, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995);
Tilton v. Marshall, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1140 (1995); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843
(Vt. 1994).
43. See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). In Cheema, the
Ninth Circuit recently held that although a school district had a compelling interest in maintaining a "no-knife" policy for students, the school district had to accommodate the religious beliefs of certain Muslim students who wished to carry
kirpans (long ceremonial knives). Id. at 885. Under Smith alone, the student would
appear to have had no recourse.
44. For a discussion of the separation of powers issues related to the constitutionality of RFRA, see Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at its Word:
The Implications for RFRA and the Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5
(1995); Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to
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In P.F. Flores v. City of Boerne,45 a federal district court in
San Antonio Texas held in an interlocutory ruling that the RFRA
is unconstitutional on its face because it violates the separation of
powers doctrine.4" According to the court, Congress did not attempt to create a statutory right but attempted to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith, and thereby restored earlier
First Amendment jurisprudence.47 Obviously, Congress cannot
"overrule" the Supreme Court on a matter of constitutional interpretation. The district court, though, was mistaken in its first
premise. The RFRA is neither a constitutional opinion nor purports to be one. The RFRA merely imports standards from certain
cases into a statute and establishes a rather explicit statutory
right. Following this reasoning, the appellate court reversed the
federal district court in Flores.4"
In re Tessier49 also held that the RFRA was unconstitutional. 50 In Tessier, a bankruptcy judge rejected a Chapter Thirteen
plan for debtors which included a proposed ten percent tithe to
.their church. 5 When the debtors asserted that they had a right
to tithe under the RFRA, the court rejected their claim by holding
that the RFRA was unconstitutional as a legislative attempt to
overrule the Supreme Court.52 Moreover, the bankruptcy court
took Flores one step further by holding that courts were prevented
from applying the Sherbert/ Yoder IRFRA test because it violated
the central holding of Smith.53 Thus, the legislature could not
adopt a judicial test specifically rejected by the Supreme Court as
unworkable. 4 Courts could not use the test because any inquiry

Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57 (1986); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995).
45. 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50306, 1996 U.S. App. WL
23205 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996).
46. Id. at 357.
47. Id. at 356.
48. See P.F. Flores v. City of Bourne, No. 95-50306, 1996 U.S. App. WL 23205
(5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996).
49. No. 94-31615-13, 1995 U.S. Bankr. WL 736461 (D. Mont. Dec. 8, 1995).
50. Id. at *11.
51. Id. at *2-4, *11.
52. Id. at *9-11.
53. Id. at *10.
54. In re Tessier, 1995 U.S. Bankr. WL 736461, *10-11 (D. Mont. Dec. 8, 1995).
The court stated that:
[T]hrough RFRA Congress purports to force the Judicial Branch to apply a
statutory standard that it has specifically rejected as judicially unworkable
in the constitutional context. To do so without tailoring the statute to address the Supreme Court's specific reasoning for its rejection of the standard
can only doom the Act to constitutional infirmity.... To apply RFRA, the
Bankruptcy Court has to fly directly in the face of the Supreme Court's
admonition that it cannot adequately evaluate and compare the competing
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into or evaluation of religious activity would present unsurmount-

able difficulties.55
On the other hand, most courts have upheld the constitutionality of the RFRA."6 These courts correctly point to the language
of the statute and its legislative history.5" The RFRA remains a
legislative act, creating a separate, federal statutory right guaranteeing the free exercise of religion with a standard of review that
is imported
from previous, but now superseded, Supreme Court
58
cases.

C. Free Exercise of Religion under State ConstitutionalLaw

Several states recognize a constitutional right to free exercise
of religion under their own constitutions. Although most of these
states interpret their provisions as coextensive with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation, a few states have recognized a separate right to free exercise independent of the Supreme Court's
analysis.5 9 This separate right rose particularly in light of the
weakened protection under the Smith decision.
II.

APPLICATION OF THE

RFRA

TO LANDLORD OWNERS

Courts have applied these Free Exercise principles to disputes in which landlords refuse to rent to unmarried couples who

interests implicated by the facts sub judice. Had the Congress not merely
sought to reinstate the same indefinite language of the SherbertYoder test;
had it instead furnished RFRA with definitions for a 'substantial burden' on
religious exercise, what constitutes a 'compelling governmental interest' in
the free exercise context, and most important perhaps, direction as to how
courts should weigh the competing interests; the Act may not have offended
Smith. Nevertheless, this Congress did not do, and therefore RFRA cannot
stand.
Id. at *10-11 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at *11.
56. See, e.g., Abordo v. Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220, 1230-33 (D. Haw. 1995). As
one of a handful of federal appellate courts reviewing cases on the RFRA's constitutionality, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has recently declined to hold the
RFRA unconstitutional. Hamilton v. Schriro, No. 94-3845, 1996 U.S. App. WL
11119 (8th Cir. Jan. 12, 1996).
57. See, e.g., Abordo, 902 F. Supp. at 1230-33.
58. Drinan & Huffman, supra note 26, at 533; Laycock & Thomas, supra note
26, at 217.
59. See generally Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Div., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d
571 (Mass. 1990); Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990);
Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); First Covenant Church
v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992); Russell Bonds, First Covenant Church v.
City of Seattle: The Washington Supreme Court Fortifies the Free Exercise Rights of
Religious Landmarks againstHistoricPreservationRestrictions, 27 GA. L. REV. 589
(1993).
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wish to "cohabit" - live together in a sexual relationship. 60 For
example, an unmarried couple will attempt to rent an apartment:
The landlord will turn them away because the landlord "does not
rent to unmarried couples." The landlord sincerely believes that
cohabitation constitutes "fornication," which is a sin prohibited by
the Bible. Moreover, the Bible provides that anyone who aids,
abets or facilitates the commission of serious sin is as guilty as
the sinner.6" Thus, if the landlord rents to the fornicators, he
will have committed a sin under the tenets of his own faith.
Upset at their rejection,62 the couple files a complaint with
the city or state under the applicable law prohibiting discrimination in housing on the basis of "marital status." At least under the
cases decided thus far, the administrative body charged with the
initial enforcement of the statute typically upholds the claim. Furthermore, the administrative orders reported thus far are actually
rather severe. They include tens of thousands of dollars in damages, attorneys' fees and the requirement that the landlord post a
sign branding himself a discriminator. When the landlord has
raised his religious beliefs as a defense to the requirement that he
rent to "sinners," the administrative body replies that nobody
forced him to become a landlord and that he should take the units
off the market if he wants to avoid a conflict with his religious
principles.
A. CurrentLaw
A case like the example is now pending on appeal in Illinois.
In Jasniowski v. Chicago Commission on Human Relations, 3 the
landlord is a born-again Christian whose sole proprietorship leases a building from his mother.6 4 He subleases a small apartment
that is located on the premises.6 5 A couple responding to his ad
told him that they were married and wrote that they were married on the rental application.6 6 Later, the landlord discovered

60. For further discussion of discrimination in housing and the free exercise of
religion rights of landlords, see Kelly Eckel, Legitimate Limitation of a Landlord's
Rights - A New Dawn for Unmarried Cohabitants,68 TEMP. L. REV. 811 (1995);
Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free"Exercise of Religion: Tenant's
Right to Discrimination-FreeHousing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699
(1995); ConstitutionalLaw - Free Exercise of Religion - Alaska Supreme Court
Holds that Housing Anti-DiscriminationLaws Protecting UnmarriedCouples Withstand A Free Exercise Challenge by a Religious Landlord - Swanner v. Anchorage

Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994), 106

HARV.

L. REV. 763 (1995).

61. See 1 Corinthians6:16.

62. This rejection may well be expected if the renters are actually "test casers."
63. No. 94 CH 5546 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct. Ill. 1994).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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that the couple had lied and refused to rent the apartment to
them.67 He stated that he could not allow fornication to happen
on the premises and that he did not rent to people who lied on
their rental applications. 6
The Chicago Commission on Human Relations, applying the
city's prohibition against discrimination in housing on the basis of
marital status, held that Jasniowski had violated the law and
ordered him to pay $634 in damages and $14,000 in attorneys'
fees. 69 The Commission also ordered the landlord to refrain from
renting his apartment in accordance with his religious beliefs.70
If the landlord could not refrain, he must surrender his leasehold
in order to avoid the conflict between his religious beliefs and the
City's fair housing ordinance. 7 ' The case is now on appeal to the
Illinois Appellate Court.
The leading decisions in this area essentially involve the
facts outlined above, except not all couples lied about their marital status. In each of the cases, the local law in question barred
discrimination on the basis of marital status. Also, in these cases,
the landlord sought an exemption from this requirement on the
grounds that his discrimination was based upon his sincere religious belief that to rent to the couple would endanger his own
soul.
In a few cases, though, landlords have successfully brought
the alternative argument that they did not violate the prohibition
against marital status discrimination. In some states or cities, a
landlord could argue that "marital status" does not refer to whether a couple is actually married but whether an individual is married, single, widowed or divorced. In other words, one might discriminate against two people according to what they propose to do
in their bedroom and not because of their status as "married" or
"unmarried."
This argument has succeeded in Illinois in Mister v. A.R.K
72
Partnership.
In Mister, the Illinois Appellate Court expressly
held that the Illinois Human Rights Act's ban on discrimination
on the basis of marital status did not apply to cohabitation.73
The court observed that the State discriminated in many ways in
favor of marriage.74 Also, the court held that Illinois enacted the
Human Rights Act at a time when the its criminal fornication

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
553 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1158.
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statute outlawed cohabitation.75 Thus, the state could not have
intended to protect cohabitation in the Human Rights Act if it
prohibited cohabitation in the fornication statute.7 6 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota, in Minnesota v. French,77 also adopted this
approach. States, however, have rejected this approach where
fornication was not illegal nor where clear legislative intent included unmarried couples in the term "marital status.""
Assuming that a statute does prohibit landlords from discriminating between married and unmarried couples, the landlord
has only one real defense to the discrimination charge. The landlord must assert that the law, as applied, places an undue burden
on his free exercise of religion that cannot be justified by any
compelling state interest. This argument has prevailed in some
jurisdictions, failed in others and has been fought to a draw in
one.
In California, the argument has succeeded in every conceivable way. In Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, the court dealt with the issue before the enactment of the
RFRA, but after the decision in Smith. The court held that the
California constitution's protection of religious liberty was broader
than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution. 80 Therefore, the
Supreme Court's decision in Smith did not constrain the California court's treatment of the landlord's free exercise claim under
the California constitution." The court held that under
California's constitution the government must justify any burden
on the free exercise of religion with a compelling state interest
is the least restrictive means available to advance
and the burden
82
that interest.

Predictably, the court found that forcing a landlord to rent
his own property to "fornicators" substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs and thus his exercise of religion. 3
Furthermore, the court held that the government could not justify
this burden with the purported state interest to prevent discrimination against unmarried couples.8 4 Interestingly, although no
dispute arose that this statute did prohibit discrimination against
unmarried couples, 5 the state's explicit policy favoring marriage
75. Id. at 1157-58.
76. Id. at 1158.
77. 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-7 (Minn. 1990).
78. Some of the states include Massachusetts, Alaska and California.
79. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
80. Id. at 38-40.
81. Id. at 39-40.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 46.
84. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 46 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993).
85. However, both Illinois and Minnesota found a dispute over this matter. See
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was still relevant to show that the state did not have a compelling
state interest in protecting cohabitation.
The decision in Smith v. FairEmployment and Housing Commission,86 echoed the Donahue decision. This court, however,
reached beyond the California constitution to apply both the First
Amendment and the RFRA in favor of the landlord. The court
held that under Smith this was a "hybrid" case because the government burdened the landlord's religious belief to deny the rental unit to the couple and burdened the landlord's right to express
his view that he preferred not to rent to unmarried couples.8 7 In
addition, the Commission ordered the landlord to post a sign essentially promising to rent to unmarried couples."8 Because of
the restrictions on religion and the compelled speech elements of
the case, the court held that under Smith the compelling state
interest test would apply and, as in Donahue, found that the state
did not have a compelling state interest to prevent discrimination
against unmarried couples.89 The court also reached the same
conclusion under the California Constitution and the RFRA as
well. 90
In French, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the state
constitution to reach this same conclusion. 9 The court held that
the state constitution offered more protection than the federal
First Amendment.92 Also, the court held that the state could not
justify the anti-discrimination statute with any compelling state
interest.9 3 In Minnesota, the court, however, included in its decision the question, "[h]ow can there be a compelling state interest
in promoting fornication when there is a state statute on the
books prohibiting it?"94
The Supreme Court of Alaska has issued the only appellate
opinion that flatly rejects the landlord's religious liberty claims in
this context. In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,95 the court held that refusal to rent to an unmarried couple
did violate the state's "marital status" provision.9" Also, the landlord could not escape this violation because he believed that renting to the unmarried couple would constitute a sin on his own

supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text.
86. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
87. Id. at 403.
88. Id. at 397-98.
89. Id. at 403-05.
90. Id. at 410, 412.
91. Minnesota v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990).
92. Id. at 8-10.
93. Id. at 10-11.
94. Id. at 10.
95. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
96. Id. at 278.
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part.97
The court first held that the landlord could not state a claim
under the First Amendment based upon the Smith decision because the law was neutral and generally applicable and no "hybrid" claim was made. 98 The court next held that under Alaska's
Constitution, as in California and Minnesota, citizens had greater
protection than under the First Amendment.99 This allowed the
court to apply the compelling state interest test.1 ° ° The court,
however, held that Alaska had a "compelling" state interest in
preventing all forms of discrimination, which justified a burden on
religion. 1 '
As the dissent noted, the court held that ensuring the right of
unmarried couples to rent from unwilling landlords was "a per se
obligation 'of the highest order,"' and such a discrimination was
"an affront to human dignity."' 2 This reasoning, said the dissent, debases the currency of prohibitions against truly invidious
discrimination, such as on the basis of race.'0 3 Finally, the court
disposed of the RFRA in a footnote by questioning its constitutionin any
ality and its application to the case, and stating 10that,
4
event, the state did have a compelling state interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the RFRA ruling in Swanner. °5 In a rare memorandum dissent, Justice
Thomas castigated the Alaska court for its misperception of the
impact of the RFRA on this dispute, and for erroneously balancing
the State's supposedly compelling interest against religious values
which Congress sought to place on a higher plane.0 6 Justice
Thomas stated:
If, despite affirmative discrimination by Alaska on the basis of marital status and a complete absence of any national policy against
such discrimination, the State's asserted interest in this case is
allowed to qualify as a 'compelling' interest - that is, a 'paramount'
interest, an interest 'of the highest order' - then I am at a loss to
know what asserted governmental interests are not compelling. The
decision of the Alaska Supreme Court drains the word compelling of
any meaning and seriously undermines the protection for exercise of

97. Id. at 278-80.
98. Id. at 280.
99. Id. at 280-83.
100. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
101. Id. at 282-83.
102. Id. at 287.
103. Id. at 288-89.
104. Id. at 280 n.9.
105. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S.Ct. 460 (1994).
106. Id. at 461-62.
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religion that Congress so emphatically mandated in RFRA.° 7
Finally, one state has fought this battle to a draw. In Attorney General v. Desilets,1'° the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found, as in California, that a landlord's refusal to rent
to an unmarried couple for religious reasons violated the marital
status protection. 1 9 As in Donahue, the case came before the
court purely on state constitutional grounds.1 0 Also, the court
held that Massachusetts' constitution afforded more protection
than the First Amendment, which mandated the imposition of the
compelling state interest test.'
Then, in a stunning move, the
court did not uphold a grant of summary judgment to the landlord, but not because it doubted the sincerity of his beliefs or the
burden on his exercise of religion."' Rather, the court refused
because the state should have the opportunity to develop evidence
on the subject of whether it has a compelling state interest to
protect unmarried couples from discrimination." 3 The court acknowledged that the state's general interest in preventing discrimination was not enough.'
Instead, it encouraged the state
to conduct a market study: "We have no sense . . . of the numbers
of rental units that might be withheld from [cohabitants] because
of the religious beliefs of the owners of rental housing."1 5 As the
dissent observed:
No combination of facts that might be found after a trial would
legally justify the imposition of [an imposed choice between violating one's religiously informed conscience or withdrawing from commercial endeavors]. . . . '[M]arital status discrimination is not as
intense a State concern as is discrimination based on certain other
classifications.' In contrast, the right to free exercise of religion is a
fundamental right."6
Assuming that the RFRA is upheld as constitutional, it is
hard to understand how any of the "marital status" statutes can
be applied to landlords refusing rentals on the basis of sincerely
held religious beliefs. Notwithstanding the Alaska court's anomalous ruling, the RFRA compels the balance of a federal statutory
right against a purported state interest in preventing discrimination in housing against unmarried couples. Unmarried couples are

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 462.
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Mass. 1994).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 246, 247 (emphasis added).
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simply not the kind of "protected class" that should receive heightened protection. Thus, that class' right to housing should not
supersede an individual's right to the free exercise of religion.
B. The Koinonia House Illustration
Although relatively few cases have used the RFRA as a
shield to liability, even fewer cases have used the RFRA or the
First Amendment as a sword to create housing rights. This illustration involves the First Amendment and the RFRA.
Koinonia House is an evangelical organization which ministers to men in prison and continues the relationship after their
release. The organization bought a house in Wheaton, Illinois,
where its executive director lived with his wife and son. This was
a single family home in a single family zone. Generally, "families"
were permitted occupants of "single family" homes. Under
Wheaton's zoning ordinance, a "family" could consist of any number of immediate family members plus up to four unrelated
adults. It did not matter that the other adults paid rent.
Realizing that most men released from prison ultimately
return to prison, Koinonia House undertook the ministry of changing this destructive cycle. Koinonia House identified what it called
"Christians," genuinely born-again Christians, while they were in
prison, and groomed them for entry into the house in Wheaton
upon release. When the men came to Wheaton, they lived as a
family in the house (always fewer than four at a time) where they
studied the Bible, prayed and prepared for re-entry into society.
They were also linked with local churches which integrated them
into the congregation and provided a social support network.
Needless to say, neighbors of Koinonia House were
displeased. In response to pressure from the neighbors, the City of
Wheaton passed a "Group Care Home Ordinance" which required
burdensome regulation of any "group care home" by a newly constituted "Group Care Home Commission." The Commission had
jurisdiction over any group care home that was not otherwise
regulated by the State or County. In other words, the city created
the Commission solely for Koinonia House.
The ordinance defined group care home as a home in which
"special needs individuals" received "counseling." The City found
that Koinonia House was a "group care home" under its ordinance
because the intense Bible study and worship at the house constituted "counseling."
Koinonia House filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, bringing a number of claims. For this
Article's purpose, the relevant analysis is that the ordinance, as
applied, was a direct regulation of religion because the City used
purely religious observances as a means to bring the house under
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its "neutral" regulatory scheme." 7 For the RFRA purposes, the
house was subject to the burden of regulation supposedly because
"counseling" occurred in the house. However, the only conduct
forming the basis of this claim was the residents' exercise of their
right to study the Bible and pray together.
The parties resolved this case in its early stages. Koinonia
House agreed to establish that it did not provide counseling services. The City agreed not to regulate Koinonia House.
CONCLUSION

Anti-discrimination statutes and policies protect individuals
and couples from invidious descrimination, such as on the basis of
race, and serve legitimate governmental purposes. The government, however, does not have a "compelling" interest in preventing discrimination against unmarried couples who wish to cohabit.
Accordingly, under the RFRA, a landlord may act in accordance
with his religious principles and deny accommodation to
cohabitants as a matter of conscience, consistent with his free
exercise of religion.

117. Thus, the regulation is subject to the compelling state interest test even
under Smith.

